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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
Case No. 990195-CA

v.

:

JEREMIAH MAUL,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1995), aggravated kidnapping, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1999), and theft of a firearm, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1999). This
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1998).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Should this Court reach defendant's peremptory challenge claim where
defendant failed to preserve it below?
Because this issue does not require this Court to review any district court ruling,

no standard of review applies.

II.

Should this Court reach defendant's juror challenge where defendant has
failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding which he
now challenges?
Because this issue does not require this Court to review any district court ruling,

no standard of review applies.
III.

Did the trial court properly refuse defendant's motion for new trial
where defendant failed to establish that, had Juror Christensen
disclosed her acquaintanceship with certain witnesses during voir dire,
she would have been removable for cause for bias?
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial

court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams,
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 757 (Utah App.)
(stating decision will not be reversed unless decision "appears to be so unreasonable that
upon review it appears that [the court] was plainly wrong, in that there is a strong
likelihood that the plaintiff could not have had a fair trial'9 (brackets in original) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996); State v.
Brown, 111 P.2d 1093, 1095-96 (Utah App. 1989). Where the trial court holds an
evidentiary hearing on a motion based on juror nondisclosure on voir dire, the court's
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. See State v. Thomas {Thomas II), 830 P.2d
243,245 (Utah 1992). The trial court's determination whether those facts would have
supported removal for cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion,1 as is its determination
1

Although Thomas II applies a correctness standard, it does so because the
trial court reached only the juror nondisclosure question and, finding it dispositive, did
2

that a juror is not otherwise biased. See Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah
1981) (recognizing trial court's "advantaged position in determining which persons would
be fair and impartial jurors" and holding that its determination "should not be disturbed
unless [it] abuses [its] discretion"); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah
1980), overruled on other grounds byRandle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993); State
v. Kavmark, 839 P.2d 860, 862 (Utah App. 1992), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rules 18, 23, and 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are set forth in
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 9, 1998, defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1995); aggravated kidnapping,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1999); and theft
of a firearm, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp.
1999) [R. 1-2]. Defendant was bound over on all counts [R. 15]. Before trial, defendant

not reach the question of removal for cause; thus the Utah Supreme Court treated the
removal question as a question of law. See Thomas II, 830 P.2d at 245.
3

filed a Notice of Alibi [R. 40]. At trial, two witnesses, Angela Goode and Mary Goode,
testified in support of defendant's alibi [R. 168-79].
At trial, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts [R. 125, 159-61]. Defendant
then filed a timely motion for new trial alleging juror misconduct [R. 176]. The trial
court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and subsequently issued Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Order denying the motion [R. 187, 196, 201;
Addendum B]. Defendant was then sentenced and thefinaljudgment and order was
issued on January 6, 1999 [R. 206]. Defendant timely appealed [R. 213, 233, 238].
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
The Crimes
On January 6, 1998, Ginger Mellor was house-sitting for her sister and brother-inlaw, Brenda and Craig Nielson, at their home in Centerfield, Utah [R. 245:943 ]. Brenda
and Craig lived there with Craig's 23-year-old son, Clay, and Brenda's 14-year old son,
Kent [R. 245:95; 246:27, 44, 48]. That day, Brenda, Craig, and Clay had gone to New
Mexico on a trucking trip [R. 245:96]. Ginger was watching Kent; Ginger's 13-year-old
daughter was also there [R. 245:96]. That night, the children went to sleep in a

2

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and the
trial court's findings of fact. See State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 878 (Utah App. 1992).
3

Because the pages of transcripts are not individually numbered, the record
citation used is to the record cite, which identifies the particular transcript, followed by
the actual page number of the transcript.
4

downstairs bedroom; Ginger went to sleep in Brenda and Craig's room upstairs [R.
245:97-98].
Ginger fell asleep around 1:00 a.m. [R. 245:98]. She was awakened when
Brenda's dog started barking [R. 245:99]. She sat straight up in the bed and instantly had
a flashlight in her face [R. 245:99]. Except for seeing Brenda's alarm clock out of the
corner of her eye, Ginger could see nothing but the flashlight [R. 245:99]. The clock
read 2:01 a.m. [R. 245:104, 141].
Defendant, who was holding the flashlight, told Ginger not to move [R. 245:101 ].
He then asked her who lived in the home; when she told him Craig and Brenda Nielson,
he asked "Where is Clay?" [R. 245:101]. After asking who she was and asking again
about Clay, defendant asked if anyone else was present [R. 245:104]. Ginger told him
about the children [R. 245:104]. Ginger then saw for the first time Ginger that defendant
was not alone; defendant leaned backwards to tell a second man about the children [R.
245:106].
Defendant then said he'd heard there was a lot of money in the house and asked
Ginger if she knew anything about it [R. 245:107]. Ginger said "no" and that the only
money she knew of was the money in her wallet [R. 245:108]. Defendant then told
Ginger that if she didn't cooperate, "he would basically blow my F-in' head off [R.
245:108]. Ginger later confirmed that defendant had a gun [R. 245:117-19].

5

Defendant then ordered Ginger downstairs and threatened her a second time [R.
245:109]. Defendant asked where the children were and shined a light in their bedroom
to make sure they were still asleep [R. 245:111]. He then asked what the next room was
and when told it was Clay's room, he said, "This is where Clay stays and this is where
Clay sleeps?" [R. 245:112]. Defendant then told Ginger to cross Clay's bed on her knees
and shut off the nightlight on the other side [R. 245:112]. After she did so, defendant told
her to remain on the bed and lay on her stomach [R. 245:112-13]. Defendant then tied
Ginger up tightly with an extension cord; he tied her wrists and then her ankles, and then
tied her wrists to her ankles [R. 245:115-17].
Defendant and his companion then started ransacking Clay's room, "opening
drawers, lookin' in the closet and whatnot" [R. 245:117]. After again threatening Ginger
and showing her his gun, defendant and his companion went upstairs, supposedly to
continue looking for the money [R. 245:117-19]. When they returned, defendant told
Ginger not to call the police "because they would be watching the house and if they seen
signs of Cop cars or red lights or anything, that they would be back, maybe not that night,
maybe not the next night, but they would be back to get their revenge" [R. 245:120]. He
told Ginger not to try to untie herself until she could no longer hear their vehicle

[R.

245:120].
After Ginger heard the vehicle leave, she called for her daughter to untie her [R.
245:120-21]. Ginger noticed that one of the phones had been ripped out of the wall; she

6

used a Mickey Mouse phone to call Brenda [R. 245:122, 221; 246:49]. Brenda told her to
get Craig's handgun out of their bedroom, leave the house, and go to their parents9 home
in Sterling [R. 245:123]. However, both the gun and its holster were missing [R.
245:124].
Ginger returned to the front room about six minutes after the intruders left; the
clock read 2:52 a.m. [R. 245:125, 130, 142]. Ginger then took the children to her parents'
home in Sterling [R. 245:126]. Deputy Sheriffs Anderson and Edwards arrived soon
thereafter [R. 245:172].
While there, Deputy Edwards used his cell phone to contact Clay Nielson [R.
245:173-74]. When Deputy Edwards told Clay about the break-in, Clay responded: "It's
that Goddamned Jeremy" [R. 245:174]. Clay explained that Jeremy lived in American
Fork with a woman named Angie [Angela Goode], that Clay and Angela had had a child
together, and that Clay and Angela were in an ongoing custody battle over the child [R.
245:175]. Clay didn't know Jeremy's last name, but told Deputy Edwards to call
Angela's mother, Mary, for more information [R. 245:175-76]. Deputy Edwards called
Mary about 4:00 a.m. [R. 245:176-77, 179]. When asked where Angela and Jeremy were,
Mary gave Deputy Edwards their American Fork address and Jeremy's last name before
abruptly ending the conversation [R. 245:177-79]. Jeremy was soon detained and taken
to the American Fork police station [R. 245:180-82].

7

At about 8:00 a.m, Deputy Edwards called Ginger and asked her to come to the
Sanpete County Sheriffs Office [R. 245:127, 182]. Deputy Edwards informed her that
they had a suspect in custody and wanted to do a voice identification [R. 245:128,183].
After the suspect had talked for about one minute, Ginger identified him as the intruder
who had threatened her [R. 245:131,186-88].
At about 6:00 p.m., Deputy Edwards met with defendant and Deputy Gary Larsen
at the police station in American Fork [R. 245:189; 246:8]. After Deputy Edwards gave
defendant his Miranda warnings, defendant agreed to talk and admitted ;i[i]t was me that
did it" [R. 245:189-93; 246:11-12]. Defendant confessed that he had entered the house
with a gun and that he was "after Clay" and had come "to kill him" [R. 245:191-95;
246:11-13]. Defendant also admitted that he had stolen both Craig's gun and the money
from Ginger's wallet [R. 245:194-95; 246:12, 13]. When asked what he had used to tie
Ginger up, defendant said it was electrical cord that he had gotten from inside the home
[R. 246:14]. Defendant told Deputy Edwards that he had thrown the two guns out the
window after leaving the Nielson residence [R. 245:186, 197-98; 246:24].
Jury voir dire
During jury voir dire, the trial court asked each venireperson for a personal
description. Juror Christensen, the juror to whom defendant's appeal relates, stated:
"Christine Christensen. I live in Fountain Green. My husband's name is Allan
Christensen, We have three kids. Um, I work at 7-Eleven in Nephi and he works at

«

Automax in Spanish Fork" [R. 245:17]. Juror Matthews, who was peremptorily struck by
defendant, indicated that he worked at a correctional facility as a teacher and was an LDS
Stake president in Gunnison [R. 245:14-15]. Juror Madsen, also peremptorily struck by
defendant, indicated that his only son was a retired police officer in Oregon [R. 245:15].
Juror Johnson, also peremptorily struck by defendant, stated that she was married and
lived in Ephraim; her husband worked for Skyline Mines and she worked for her father's
construction company [R. 245:17]. She had four children, including a two year old [R.
245:18].
Later in voir dire, the trial court asked the attorneys to introduce themselves, their
parties, and their witnesses [R. 245:20-23]. The court then asked the venirepersons
whether any of them were related to any of those people or shared a business relationship,
or a guardian/ward, employer/employee, attorney/client, creditor/debtor, or
landlord/tenant relationship with them [R. 245:23-26]. The court then stated:
All right. I'm going to ask now about more general relationships.
Before I do, I need to draw a distinction between acquaintanceships and
close relationships.
We live in a small area. It's not uncommon that you would know
everyone in the town where you live and maybe everyone in the end of the
county where you live and maybe many people throughout the county. I'm
not concerned about general acquaintanceships, because those are just so
common that we all live with those every day and adjust to them. I am
concerned about close relationships that could compromise your ability to
be fair. I'll give you an example.
In my neighborhood, ah, I'm acquainted with everyone, but there are
certain ones that I have much closer relationship. My neighbor across the
street, we play golf together and we go fishing when we can find time. And
if he were involved, I would feel a level of discomfort in—in deciding
9

important issues because we have a relationship as close [sic]. That's what
I'm concerned about is whether there's any one of you who has a close
relationship, a sufficiently close relationship with the defendant, the
lawyers, the alleged victim
I'm concerned about a sufficiently close
relationship that it would compromise your ability to be fair and objective.
[R. 245:26-27]. Juror Collard indicated that she had bowled with Brenda "for a year, but
I don't know her very well," that it was about two years ago that they had bowled
together, that it was weekly contact, and that there were a lot of other people there at the
same time [R. 245:27-28]. When asked whether "there [is] anything about that
relationship that would cause you to be prejudiced for or against a position that she might
advance or testimony she might give," Juror Collard said "no" [R. 245:28]. The defense
attorney stated that he was "just a teeny uncomfortable" with Juror Collard," that
"probably there isn't any problem," and that "[i]f it were a little closer in time, I think I'd
have grounds for objection" [R. 245:50-51].
Juror Ludvigson indicated that, as mayor of Sterling, he had employed Deputy
Sheriffs Edwards and Larsen on off-hours but that he could decide the case fairly [R.
245:28-29]. Juror Ludvigson indicated that it had been some three or four years since
Deputy Edwards had worked for his town and that Larsen hadn't worked "for us quite
some time and he just kind of started up again" [R. 245:49].
Juror Larsen indicated that he knew the prosecuting attorney from high school, but
that it was "[n]ot a close relationship" [R. 245:32-3].

10

Although the trial court allowed defense counsel to ask additional questions on
numerous occasions, defense counsel neither objected to the trial court's description of
the relationships that should be disclosed nor asked any additional questions on that issue
[R. 245:39-44,46-47,48-50]. Defendant made no challenges for cause.4 Defendant used
his peremptory challenges on Jurors Collard, Mathews, Madsen, and Johnson [R. 126, R.
245:60].
Hearing on motion for new trial
Defendant's motion for new trial focused exclusively on Juror Christensen. He
asserted that she "was not candid, honest and forthcoming in her answers to voir dire
questions" [R. 176]. Specifically, defendant claimed that Juror Christensen had failed to
disclose her positive relationships with two State witnesses and her negative relationships
with two defense witnesses [R. 177-78]. Affidavits of two defense witnesses, Angela
Goode and Mary Goode, supported defendant's motion [R. 168-79]. Angela Goode was

4

Neither defendant nor the State requested that any venireperson be removed
for cause. The trial court did, however, excuse five venirepeople on its own motion: Ila
M. Edwards, who is witness Blake Edwards' mother [R. 245:24]; DeeAnn T. Pratt, who
indicated she would probably by biased due to the fact that her husband's office had been
burglarized [R. 245:31-32]; D. Kent Despain, who indicated he would not be able to be
impartial based on information he had already received concerning the crime [R. 245:47];
Don Blain Taylor, who, along with his wife, works for the State of Utah Correctional
Facility and indicated that "[i]f I were a defendant, though, I wouldn't want me on the
jury" [R. 245:53-55]; and Lorraine N. Bailey, who indicated she was very good friends
with "Fred [Craig?] Nielson" [R. 245:55-56].
11

defendant's girlfriend at the time of trial and testified as an alibi witness; Mary Goode is
Angela Goode's mother and also testified in favor of defendant at trial [R. 168-79].
Mary Goode's affidavit alleged that Juror Christensen was acquainted with one of
the State's witnesses, Clay Nielson [R. 171]. It alleged that Clay often visited his brother,
who lived across from the Christensens, and that Clay was a long-time friend of Juror
Christensen's husband [R. 171]. Mary Goode's affidavit also alleged that Juror
Christensen had worked under Mary Goode's supervision as a maid for Super 8 Motel in
1996 or 1997 and that Mary Goode was instrumental in having Juror Christensen fired
from that position [R. 169-70].
Angela Goode's affidavit alleged that Juror Christensen knew Angela Goode and
had helped spread false accusations concerning Angela Goode's relationship with Juror
Christensen's husband [R. 168-79].
In his motion for new trial, defendant argued that had Juror Christensen revealed
this information during jury voir dire, she "would have been subject to challenge and
based upon any of this information would have entitled the Defendant to inquire further
as to the circumstances surrounding that termination, acquaintances and to the bias,
adversity or prejudice created by those acquaintances[,] termination of employment,
adverse accusations and relationships" [R. 178]. Juror Christensen's failure to do so,
claimed defendant, denied him his right to a jury "free from bias, prejudice or
impartiality" [R. 178].

12

At the motion hearing, defendant called only two witnesses, Juror Christensen
and Angela Goode. Juror Christensen testified that she did not know the full name of
the person named Nielson who lived across the street from her; that neither Craig
Nielson nor Clay Nielson had been to her house while she lived there; that she had
never heard her husband speak of any of the Nielson brothers; and that she "never
knew Craig Nielson" and "Clay Nielson I had seen, but I didn't know who he was" [R.
244:8-9, 14].
Juror Christensen also testified that she had worked with Mary Goode for two
months in 1993 at Super-8; that the two are not well-acquainted; that her only
association with Mary Goode was that they "passed in the halls"; that Mary Goode was
not Juror Christensen's supervisor; that the two may have used the same cart but did
not talk about their lives, activities, etc.; that they never car-pooled; and that they may
have passed each other on the Fountain Green streets [R. 244:9-12]. Finally, Juror
Christensen testified that she had met Angela Goode about five years before the trial;
that she had attended a cook-out with her husband and friends at which Angela Goode
was present; and that she had not heard of any allegations that her husband and Angela
Goode had any kind of social relationship [R. 244:13-14].
Angela Goode testified that Juror Christensen was "4[p]robably not' anything
more than a casual acquaintance"; that she did not know whether her mother had ever
socialized with Juror Christensen; that although she occasionally ran into Juror
13

Christensen at 7-Eleven, she never went there to visit Juror Christensen — rather, Juror
Christensen "just happened to be workin'"; that she did not know whether the
Christensens were friends with Clay Nielson's family or whether they ever socialized
together; and that Angela Goode had never heard Juror Christensen discuss any
accusations concerning Angela Goode and Juror Christensen's husband [R. 244:23-24,
29].
The trial court found that, because Angela Goode had an ongoing relationship
with defendant and because both she and her mother had displayed a highly favorable
attitude toward defendant at the trial, their testimony was less credible than was Juror
Christensen's [R. 244:36-37; R. 199].
Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that "[n]o actual or implied bias
against the defendant by [Juror] Christensen has been shown" and that ;w[n]° basis would
have existed for any challenge for cause against [Juror] Christensen" [R. 199-200]. The
trial court thus denied defendant's motion [R. 200].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that he "was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury by Juror
Christine Christensen's failure to advise the trial court of her relationship with several key
witnesses during jury selection and voir dire." Aplt. Br. at 15.
To the extent defendant claims error in the trial court's conduct of voir dire,
defendant failed to preserve this claim below and has therefore waived it. To the extent
14

defendant challenges a trial court finding on the motion for new trial, defendant has failed
to sufficiently marshal the evidence in support of that finding and, thus, has waived his
claim on this ground also. Finally, defendant's claim fails on the merits because
defendant could not demonstrate that disclosure by Juror Christensen would have
subjected her to removal for cause or that Juror Christensen was otherwise biased toward
defendant.

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT
FAILED TO PRESERVE IT BELOW
On appeal, defendant claims that Juror Christensen's "failure to disclose even the

casual nature of her relationship [sic] with the Nielson's [sic] and more particularly with
Mary and Angela Goode" during voir dire denied him "his right to a fair and impartial
jury." Aplt. Br. at 15, 16 (emphasis added). Defendant further asserts that Juror
Christensen's "failure to disclose any relationship between her and the defense witnesses
prevented the trial court and counsel from engaging in further investigation of any actual
bias on the part of [Juror] Christensen as it related to her feelings toward Mary and
Angela Goode" and "prevented [defendant] from collecting the data which would have
permitted the informed exercise of a peremptory challenge to dismiss [Juror] Christensen
from the jury panel." Aplt. Br. at 17 (emphasis added).
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Thus, defendant apparently finds error in the trial court's explanation to the
venirepeople that the only relationships they had to disclose were those which could
interfere with their ability to be fair and impartial and that they did not have to disclose
relationships that were of a purely casual nature [R. 245:23-26]. However, defendant
never objected to this explanation. Furthermore, the trial court gave defendant numerous
opportunities to ask the venirepeople additional questions on voir dire. Although availing
himself more than once of those opportunities, defendant never asked any further
questions on the relationship issue [R. 245:39-44, 46-47, 48-50].5 Any attack on the
scope of voir dire is therefore waived.
"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim
on appeal." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Furthermore, "[i]t is not the
paternalistic duty of the court to interject itself into the voir dire process by fashioning
additional voir dire questions that neither party has requested." Davis v. Grand Cty Serv.
Area, 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah App. 1995). Thus, "failure to voir dire the jurors on [an]
issue or object to the trial court's failure to cover the issue constitutes a waiver and bars

5

Unlike State v. Saunders, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah June 11, 1999), then,
this is not a case where the trial court has unduly restricted defendant's voir dire. See
Saunders, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (finding error in trial court where "prospective
juror's answers provide evidence of possible bias and the trial court does not allow further
questions designed to probe the extent and the depth of the bias" (emphasis added)).
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inquiry into the bias question." State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); see also
State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (holding failure to object to
trial court's voir dire or to ask permission to personally voir dire jury effectively waived
issue ofjury bias).
Because defendant neither objected to the trial court's conduct of jury voir dire nor
availed himself of the opportunity to ask the venirepeople any additional questions
concerning their knowledge of trial witnesses, defendant has waived any claim of juror
bias based on the relationship issue and this Court should not consider it.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
WHICH HE NOW CHALLENGES
The remainder of defendant's argument appears to rest on his assertion that "the

relationship between [J]uror Christensen and Mary and Angela Goode goes beyond the
casual nature found by the trial court after trial." Aplt. Br. at 17; see also Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Finding 15 [R. 199]. Defendant thus attacks a factual
finding of the trial court.
A trial court's factual findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah
1987). To challenge a trial court's factual findings on appeal, the "appellant must
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marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is
insufficient to support the findings against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,
475-76 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert,
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Defendant has neither marshaled all of the evidence
in support of the trial court's finding, nor demonstrated that such evidence is
insufficient to support the finding. Instead, defendant appears to be merely rearguing
his case to this Court. However, an appellate court "[does] not weigh conflicting
evidence, nor [does it] substitute [its] judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that
of the [fact finder]." State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Utah App. 1995); State v.
Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 132 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 879
(Utah App. 1992). Thus, this Court should not consider defendant's claim.
In any case, the evidence as properly marshaled clearly supports the trial court's
finding that Juror Christensen's relationships with Mary Goode and Angela Goode were
both "casual" and "minimal": Juror Christensen worked with Mary Goode for only two
months in 1993—five years prior to defendant's trial [R. 244:9-11]. They are not wellacquainted [R. 244:9]. Mary Goode was not Juror Christensen's supervisor [R.
244:10]. Juror Christensen's only association with Mary Goode was that they "passed
in the halls" and may have used the same cart [R. 244:10-11]. They did not talk about
18

their lives, activities, etc. [R. 244:11]. They never car-pooled [R. 244:12]. They may
have passed each other on the Fountain Green streets [R. 244:12]. Juror Christensen
met Angela Goode about five years before the trial [R. 244:13]. Angela Goode
attended a cook-out at which Juror Christensen was present with her husband and his
friends [R. 244:13]. Juror Christensen had not heard of any allegations that her
husband and Angela Goode had any kind of social relationship [R. 244:13-14]. Even
defense witness Angela Goode considered Juror Christensen as "6[p]robably not'
anything more than a casual acquaintance"; she was not aware of any social interactions
between her mother and Juror Christensen [R. 244:22-23, 29]. Although Angela
Goode occasionally ran into Juror Christensen at 7-Eleven, Angela Goode never went
there to visit Juror Christensen; rather, Juror Christensen "just happened to be
workin'" [R. 244:23], Angela Goode had never heard Juror Christensen discuss any
accusations concerning Angela Goode and Juror Christensen's husband [R. 244:24].
Thus, the finding is not "clearly erroneous." The evidence clearly supports the
trial court's finding that "[Juror] Christensen's relationship and knowledge relating to
Mary Goode [and] Angela Goode . . . are all of a casual nature" and that u[h]er contact
with all of these people was minimal." See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Finding 15 [R. 199]. Thus, to the extent defendant's argument requires an opposite
finding, his claim on appeal necessarily fails.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THAT, HAD JUROR CHRISTENSEN DISCLOSED
HER ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITH CERTAIN WITNESSES
DURING VOIR DIRE, SHE WOULD HAVE BEEN REMOVABLE
FOR CAUSE FOR BIAS
Defendant argues that he "was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury by Juror

Christine Christensen's failure to advise the trial court of her relationship with several key
witnesses during jury selection and voir dire." Aplt. Br. at 15. He claims that "[Juror]
Christensen's failure to disclose any relationship between her [sic] and the defense
witnesses prevented the trial court and counsel from engaging in further investigation of
any actual bias on the part of Christensen as it related to her feelings toward Mary and
Angela Goode" that might have supported a challenge for cause. Aplt. Br. at 16-17.6 To
obtain a new trial based on juror nondisclosure, defendant had to demonstrate (1) that
Juror Christensen failed to disclose information on a material question during voir dire,
and (2) that disclosure would have given defendant grounds to challenge Juror
Christensen for cause. See State v. Thomas, (Thomas I), 111 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989)
(citing McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S. Ct. 845,

6

Defendant's appeal relies solely on Juror Christensen's knowledge of some
witnesses as the source of her alleged bias; he has made no allegations that Juror
Christensen was otherwise biased and thus any reference by defendant to "actual bias" is
to that bias allegedly reflected in Juror Christensen's nondisclosure. See Aplt. Br. at 16;
State v. Thomas, (Thomas I), 111 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989).
20

850 (1984)); State v. Brown, 111 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).7 Defendant has
failed to carry that burden.
The trial court found that "[Juror] Christensen did not advise the Court about any
acquaintance she had with any of the above four named witnesses [i.e., Mary Goode,
Angela Goode, Clay Nielson and Craig Nielson]." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Finding 4 [R. 197]. The trial court also found, however, that during voir dire it had
only instructed the jurors to disclose "any relationship or acquaintance they had with the
witnesses that was something other than the casual acquaintance acquired by people
living in small towns," id, Finding 5 (emphasis added) [R. 197]; that Juror Christensen*s
"relationship and knowledge relating to Mary Goode, Angela Goode, Clay Nielson and
Craig Niesen are all of a casual nature"; and that "[h]er contact with all of these people
was minimal," id., Finding 15 [R. 199]. Thus, the question asked on voir dire was
whether any venireperson had something other than a casual relationship with any of the

7

Although defendant claims that Juror Christensen's nondisclosure interfered
with his ability to exercise a peremptory challenge against her, such an argument is
irrelevant under McDonough: "'[I]t ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the
slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an
item of information which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on voir dire
examination.'" Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1483 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S. Ct. at 849); see also Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895
P.2d 391, 395 (Utah App. 1995); Cannon v. A.L. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir.
1988). Again, this is not a case where the trial court improperly limited the defendant's
opportunity to ask questions during voir dire. Cf. State v. Saunders, 371 Utah Adv. Rep.
6, 13 (Utah June 11, 1999).
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witnesses. Because Juror Christensen did not have anything more than a casual
relationship with any of them, she was not required to respond to the question. There was
no lack of disclosure on Juror Christensen's part; under the question as asked, she simply
had nothing to disclose.8 Thus, defendant has failed to establish, as he must under the
first prong of McDonough, that Juror Christensen failed to answer a voir dire question
honestly. See Thomas I, 777 P.2d at 451.
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate that disclosure of Juror Christensen's
minimal contact with some of the witnesses would have exposed her to a successful
challenge for cause. Rule 18(e)(4) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
a juror may be challenged for cause where there exists "any social, legal, business,
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness . . . ,
which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the
8

Even if the question had required the venirepeople to disclose any
acquaintanceships with the witnesses, defendant has failed to establish that such a
question was "material" under McDonough. Under McDonough, a voir dire question is
not material if its only relevance is to provide defendant with information with which to
exercise a peremptory challenge against a juror. "'It ill serves the important end of
finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process
because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he should have obtained
from a juror on voir dire examination/" Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1483 (10th Cir.
1987) (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S. Ct. at 849). To be material, the
question must be "germane to [the juror's] capacity to sit as an impartial juror." State v.
Pierce, 788 P.2d 352, 356 (N.M. 1990). The question of whether Juror Christensen had a
casual acquaintanceship with any witness where that acquaintanceship would not affect
her ability to be fair and impartial simply is not a question that is "germane to [Juror
Christensen's] capacity to sit as an impartial juror." Id.
22

prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of
favoritism." Utah R. Cr. P. 18(e)(4).
Rule 18(e)(14) provides that a juror may be challenged for cause where a "state of
mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to either party, which
will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of
the party challenging"). See id. 18(e)(14).
Utah courts read these rules to mean that a juror is removable for cause only if that
juror has "strong and deep impressions" regarding a party, counsel, or a witness to the
proceeding or regarding the underlying subject matter of the proceeding. See State v.
Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983) (stating "[o]nly 'strong and deep impressions'
on the part of a venireman, however, serve as a basis for disqualification for cause" and
"question of degree of partiality (or 'impressions') remains largely within the discretion
of the trial court"); State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 939 (Utah App. 1990). The Utah
Supreme Court itself has distinguished between "acquaintances, which connotes mere
familiarity with the identity of the witnesses," and "friendships, viz., a relationship of
affection, respect, or esteem." State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah 1977)
(reversing trial court's denial of removal for cause of two jurors who indicated close
friendships with State witnesses).
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The trial court found that Juror Christensen had worked with Mary Goode for a
short two-month period somefiveyears prior to trial, that their contact "was minimal,
of a short duration and of a nonpersonal nature," that Juror Christensen knew Mary
Goode "only . . . as a person who lived in the same town . . . and worked at the same
motel for 2 months," and that Juror Christensen has had no contact with Mary Goode
since 1993. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings 6, 7 [R. 197-98]. The
court also found that Juror Christensen knew who Angela Goode was but that they were
"just casual acquaintances" and that Juror Christensen had no knowledge of any rumors
that Angela Goode was having an affair with Juror Christensen's husband. See id.,
Findings 11-13 [R. 198-99]. Furthermore, the court found that Juror Christensen "had
no personal contact with Clay Nielson at all other than knowing who he was" and that,
although Craig Nielson lived across the street from her at one time, "[s]he had no contact
with him" and "all she knew about him at the time . . . was that his name was Nielson."
See id., Findings 8, 10 [R. 198].
Finally, the trial court found that, because of Angela Goode's and Mary Goode's
relationship to defendant, their testimony was less credible than was Juror
Christensen's. See Transcript of Hearing on Defense Motion for New Trial [R. 244:3637]; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Finding 14 [R. 199]; see also State v.
Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1108 n.2 (Utah 1977) (noting "self-interest may discount
24

credibility"); State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109, 1113 n.3 (Utah App. 1998) (deferring to
trial court where "'body language' factors . . . may have weighed heavily in the judge's
decision"); Reed, 839 P.2d at 880 (deferring to trial court which "expressed doubts
about the believability of [defendant's] girlfriend's testimony" where " trial court had
the opportunity to view these witnesses and weigh their credibility").
These findings clearly show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that "[n]o actual or implied bias against the defendant by Christine
Christensen has been shown" and that "[n]o basis would have existed for any challenge
for cause against Mrs. Christensen." [R. 199-200]. F
The trial court's conclusion is consistent with State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 1123, 1126
(Utah 1989), where the Utah Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's refusing to
dismiss a juror for cause where voir dire questioning revealed that the juror's "brief
acquaintance with the prosecutor was not the type of relationship that would warrant an
inference of bias, especially in light of a later statement where she expressed no doubts
about her ability to decide the case impartially regardless of any attenuated acquaintance
with the prosecutor." Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126; see also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,
177-78 (Utah App. 1992) (rejecting challenge to adequacy of trial court voir dire where
venireperson's responses "could reasonably be viewed as constituting the product of a
light impression and not one that would close the mind against the testimony that may be
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offered in opposition" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Woolley,
810 P.2d 440, 448 (Utah App.) (stating "remoteness of the incident suggests less
possibility of current bias"), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); State v. Brown, 111
P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In addition, the trial court's conclusion is consistent with defense counsel's
conduct during voir dire. Defense counsel acknowledged that a relatively recent
relationship between Juror Collard and a State witness was insufficient to remove Juror
Collard for cause. He also chose not to challenge either Juror Ludvigson or Juror Larsen
for cause despite Juror Ludvigson's ongoing work relationships with Deputy Sheriffs
Edwards and Larsen and Juror Larsen's familiarity with the prosecuting attorney who had
been a classmate. See page 10 herein.
Thus, Juror Christensen did not fail to fully respond to any material question; nor
would the facts, had she volunteered them, have provided any ground to challenge her for
cause. Juror Christensen harbored no "strong"or "deep" feelings for one side over the
other. Thus, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for new trial and this
Court should affirm that denial.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are
completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side,
beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the
remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the
jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose
names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the
defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the
trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all
jurors summoned and may be taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure
from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and
shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall specifically set forth the
facts constituting the grounds of the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing
may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The
jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the
hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors
to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause.
A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn
to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made
after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the
prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised
separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be
taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of performing the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged
to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution
was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business,fiduciaryor other relationship
between, the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror
would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is
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indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action,
or having complained against or having been accused by him in a criminal
prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
particular offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after
the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant
for the act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of such
conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror
from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction regardless of the
facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying on
of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on
the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed
an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon
public rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before
peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate
juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence
and the instructions of the court.
CroM References. — Number of jurors,
Utah Const.. Art. I, Sec. 10; § 78-46-5.
Selection of jury, i 78-46-1 et seq.

Rule 23. Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the tacts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be
just and proper under the circumstances.

Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

JERAMIAH J. MAUL,

)

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Criminal No. 981600003
Assigned Judge: Kay L. Mclff

)

The defendant's Motion for a New Trial having come before the Court on November 4,1998.
The defendant was personally present and was represented by his attorney, Randy Kester. The State
was represented by Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having heard witnesses
in this matter, and arguments thereon, and being fully advised in the premises now makes the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1) Christine Christensen served as ajuror in the above entitled case on August 27th and 28th,
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1998. Defendant found guilty by the jury of 3 felony offenses.
2) Mary Goode and Angela Goode were witnesses for the defendant at trial. Angela Good
was the defendant's main alibi witness. Angela Goode was living with the defendant in American
Fork, Utah on the date the offense was committed. Mary Goode is the mother of Angela Goode.
3) Clay Nielsen and Craig Nielsen testified for the State at the trial.

Clay Nielsen and

Angela Goode had a child together prior to the date of the offense but were not married. Clay
Nielsen is the son of Craig Nielsen.
4) When the Court was picking jurors in this case the above named four witnesses were
named and identified by the parties as potential witnesses. Christine Christensen did not advise the
Court about any acquaintance she had with any of the above four named witnesses.
5) The Court had instructed all potential jurors to inform the Court about any relationship
or acquaintance they had with the witnesses that was something other than the casual acquaintance
acquired by people living in small towns.
6)

For a two month period in 1993 Christine Christensen and Mary Goode worked as

housekeepers (maids) in the same motel in Nephi, Utah. Christensen's contact with Mary Goode was
minimal, of a short duration, and of a nonpersonal nature dealing with their duties as housekeepers.
7)

Christine Christensen had no social involvement, contact, or relationship with Mary
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Goode outside of work at the motel in 1993 and only knew her as a person who lived in the same
town, Fountain Green, and who worked at the same motel for 2 months in 1993. Since 1993 she
has had no contact with Mary Goode.
8) For approximately 8 years Christine Christensen lived at 40 North State Street in Fountain
Green, Utah. For part of that time Craig Nielsen lived across the State Highway from her. That all
she knew about him at the time they lived across the highwayfromeach other was that his name was
Nielsen. She had no contact with him.
9) After the trial in this matter Christine Christensen moved from 40 North State Street in
Fountain Green to 477 South 200 West in Fountain Green, Utah. That the home at 40 North State
Street in Fountain Green was a rental home. After the Christensen's left the home the owner of the
home re-rented the home to Clay Nielsen. Christine Christensen had nothing to do with the rental
of the home by the owner to Clay Nielsen.
10)

Christine Christensen had no personal contact with Clay Nielsen at all other than

knowing who he was.
11) Angela Goode lived in Fountain Green with her mother Mary Goode for approximately
10-12 years. During that time Christine Christensen became aware of who she was. During that
time they had been together at the same social function with several other people but were just casual
acquaintances.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - State of Utah vs. Maul - 981600003 - Page 4

12)

Christine Christensen also had contact with Angela Goode at Christine's place of

employment, the 7-11 store in Nephi. That those contacts were incidental relating to Angela going
into the store for business purposes.
13) Allegations made by Angela Goode that a rumor existed in Fountain Green that Angela
Goode was having an affair with Christine Christensen's husband were un-communicated to and
unknown by Mrs. Christensen. The Courtfindsno credibility in these un-communicated innuendoes.
14)

The Court finds that in instances of conflict between the testimony of Christine

Christensen and Angela Goode, the testimony of Christine Christensen to be more credible.
15) Christine Christensen's relationship and knowledge relating to Mary Goode, Angela
Goode, Clay Nielsen and Craig Nielsen are all of a casual nature. Her contact with all of these people
was minimal.
16) Mary Goode and Angela Goode both knew who Christine Christensen was, and that she
was a potential juror prior to her being picked to serve on the jury.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court having made the above and foregoing Findings of Fact now makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
1) No actual or implied bias against the defendant by Christine Christensen has been shown.
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2) No basis would have existed for any challenge for cause against Mrs. Christensen.
3) The defendant's Motion for a New Trial should be denied.
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DATED this J j ^ d ^ f N u m b e r 1QQ^
BYTHECOURT:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the defendant's attorney, Randy Kester
at 101 East 200 South, Springville, Utah 84663, postage prepaid this _2?* day ofNovember, 1998.

^Secretary
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357
Sanpete County Attorney
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435) 835-6381
Facsimile: (435) 835-6383

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]

vs.

|

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER

JEREMIAH MAUL,

>

Criminal No. 981600003

]i

Assigned Judge: Kay L. Mclff

Defendant.

Defendant's motion for a new trial having come before the Court on November 4,1998. The
defendant was personally present and represented by his attorney, Randy Kester. The State was
represented by Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having entered it's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law now hereby makes the following Judgement and Order:
1) The defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied.
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DATED this_LL^day oENuvembei, 1998.

KAY
DIST

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Judgement and Order to the defendant's attorney, Randy Kester at 101 East 200 South, Springville,
Utah 84663, postage prepaid t h i s ^ ^ a y of November, 1998.

-OU

Secretary /
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